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Section 411(a) of the
Copyright Act of 1976
provides that "no civil
action for infringement of
the copyright in any
United States work shall
be instituted until
preregistration or
registration of the
copyright claim has been
made." In this case, a
district court approved a
class action settlement
that purported to resolve
both registered and
unregistered copyright
claims. The Supreme
Court is being asked to
decide whether that
registration requirement
is a limitation on federal

I-

court subject-matter
jurisdiction.
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ISSUE
Does section 411(a) of the
Copyright Act restrict the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the federal
courts over copyright infringement
actions?
FACTS
In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,
533 U.S. 483 (2001), the Supreme
Court held that § 201(c) of the
Copyright Act does not permit publishers to reproduce freelance works
electronically without specific permission from the authors. Shortly
after Tasini, three preexisting class
action infringement suits and one
subsequent class action suit were
consolidated in the Southern
District of New York. The plaintiffs
are authors and trade groups representing authors. The defendants are
companies that publish original
electronic content, such as the New
York Times, and companies that

operate electronic databases of that
content, such as Reed Elsevier.
The plaintiffs produced written
works for the defendants on a freelance basis, licensed only for print
publication. Without the plaintiffs'
specific permission, the defendants
also published the works electronically, ostensibly in violation of
Tasini. Hence, the plaintiffs claimed
damages for copyright infringement.
Settlement negotiations commenced, and the parties reached an
agreement. The settlement divided
the plaintiffs into three categories.
Category A claims concerned copyrights registered prior to any
infringement and thus eligible for
statutory damages and attorney's
fees under § 412. Category B claims
concerned copyrights that were
timely registered after infringement,
thus qualifying for actual damages
only. Category C claims concerned
all other works, most of which were
never registered. The overwhelming
majority of works at issue fell into
Category C, though it appears that
the class representatives hold a relatively disproportionate percentage
of the Category A and B works.
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The agreement assigned a damages
formula to each category. Category
A claimants were to receive a flat
fee. Category B and C claimants
were to receive the greater of either
a flat fee or a percentage of the original price of the work, but if the
cost of all claims and administrative
expenses exceeded $18 million,
then the amount paid to Category C
claimants would be reduced before
the claims of the other categories
were affected. In return for payment, the agreement would grant
irrevocable, transferable, and perpetual licenses for electronic use of
the class members' work.
Having reached agreement, the parties moved for class certification
and settlement approval under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Ten individual authors
objected to the motion on the
ground that the settlement was
unfair to Category C claimants. The
named parties countered that the
Category C claimants had essentially worthless claims under § 411(a)
of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)), which states that "no
action for infringement ... shall be
instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim."
The district court certified the class
and approved the settlement. The
objectors appealed, again challenging the fairness of the settlement.
The Second Circuit, however, in In
re Literary Works in Electronic
DatabasesCopyright Litigation,
509 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated
the certification and settlement on
the ground that the district court
lacked jurisdiction. The court, relying primarily on circuit precedent,
held that § 411(a) imposed a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of
an infringement claim in federal
court. It also held that each claim
within the certified class must meet
the registration requirement, and
that supplemental jurisdiction

under § 1367 of title 28 of the U.S.
Code could not extend to the unregistered claims. Judge John Walker
dissented and would have held
§ 411 to impose a nonjurisdictional
requirement that the defendants
waived.
The defendants petitioned for certiorari, joined by the plaintiffs and
objectors. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and, because all
parties opposed the Second Circuit's
judgment, appointed Professor
Deborah Jones Merritt, of the Ohio
State University School of Law, to
argue as amicus curiae in support of
the judgment.
CASE ANALYSIS
Both the petitioners (the defendants
below) and the respondents (the
plaintiffs and objectors below) argue
that § 411(a) imposes a nonjurisdictional precondition that may be
waived. The court-appointed amicus, arguing in support of the
Second Circuit's judgment, contends
that the rule is jurisdictional and
nonwaivable, and thus must be
enforced by the court even if no
party wishes it to be.
Several factors can inform whether
a rule is jurisdictional (and thus
nonwaivable) or nonjurisdictional
(and thus, presumably, waivable).
Statutory text, statutory context,
the focus of the rule, whether it separates classes of cases or provides a
mechanism for the processing of
claims, the policies behind the rule,
and historical treatment are all factors that the Court has used in the
past to aid the jurisdictional characterization inquiry.
According to the petitioners, characterizing § 411(a) as nonjurisdictional is supported by its text.
Section 411(a) uses the phrase
"shall not be instituted" (language
often characterized as nonjurisdictional) instead of specific jurisdic-

tion-limiting language (such as "no
court shall have jurisdiction"). The
Supreme Court, in Rockwell
InternationalCorp. v. United
States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007), and
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500 (2006), previously imposed a
presumption against jurisdictionality unless the statute clearly employs
jurisdictional language. The language of § 411(a) does not clearly
use jurisdiction-limiting language,
and so, the petitioners argue, the
presumption should apply. By contrast, they point out, § 1338 of
title 28 of the U.S. Code expressly
confers exclusive jurisdiction over
copyright claims on federal district
courts and does not limit that
jurisdiction only to registered
copyrights.
Statutory context both supports and
undermines a nonjurisdictional
characterization. As the petitioners
argue, the Copyright Act refers to
§ 411(a) as a "requirement" in
§ 501(b) even while in § 502(a) it
refers to the "jurisdiction" of the
district court. Indeed, § 411(a) itself
expressly addresses the "jurisdiction" of the court to determine the
registrability of the copyright claim,
and thus § 411(a)'s failure to designate registration as "jurisdictional"
suggests that it is not. The courtappointed amicus, on the other
hand, argues that the mention of
jurisdiction in one part of § 411(a)
means that § 411(a) in total is a
jurisdictional provision, and thus
the limitations imposed by it are
also jurisdictional.
The petitioners argue that the focus
of § 411(a)-on party actions rather
than court actions-supports a nonjurisdictional characterization. The
provision prevents a party from
instituting suit prior to registration.
Registration involves a party's submission of a photocopy of the work
to the Copyright Office, an application for registration, and a fee.
(Continued on Page 36)
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Institution of suit obviously involves
a party's filing of a complaint and
service upon the defendants.
Thus according to the petitioners,
§ 411(a) is directed at party actions,
not court power. Jurisdictional rules
typically address the latter.
The amicus counters that § 411(a)
separates classes of cases, namely,
claims based on registered works
and claims based on unregistered
works. Jurisdictional rules tend to
delineate classes of cases, while
nonjurisdictional rules tend to control modes of relief or mechanisms
to process claims already under a
court's adjudicatory authority.
The amicus argues that the underlying policies of § 411(a) support a
jurisdictional characterization.
Often, a rule that protects system or
societal values comes with a jurisdictional characterization because
those values are too important to be
left to the whims of individual litigants. On the flip side, a rule that
addresses the rights and obligations
of parties generally is nonjurisdictional and may be waived by them
at their pleasure. Here, a primary
function of § 411(a) is to ensureby providing the registrant with a
right to sue-that the Library of
Congress maintains copies of U.S.
works that are available to the public. That purpose is public and furthers the societal value of maintaining copies of works. The amicus
therefore argues that if the registration requirement of § 411(a) were
subject to the whim of private parties, they could devise ways to
retain their litigable claims while
circumventing the burdensome registration process and its filing fees,
while in the process undermining
the ability of the Library of
Congress to maintain a repository
of works for the public. As a result,
she contends, protection of that
public function of § 411(a) requires

a jurisdictional characterization
of the rule.
The amicus also argues that a jurisdictional characterization comports
with nearly 100 years' worth of lower federal courts, legislators, and
copyright experts characterizing
§ 411(a) as jurisdictional. Although
she does not point to any U.S.
Supreme Court cases characterizing
it as such, she does argue that no
court has ever held the registration
requirement to be waivable.
Both the petitioners and the respondents make separate and additional
(and not entirely covered by the
question presented for certiorari)
arguments in opposition to the
Second Circuit's judgment. The petitioners and amici publishers supporting reversal assert that § 411(a),
even if jurisdictional, only prohibits
the "institution" of a claim, not the
release of one. Membership in a
class is not the equivalent of filing a
claim, the petitioners argue, and
therefore the district court had the
power to approve a settlement that
releases the never-before-"instituted" claims, even if it would not have
had the power to adjudicate them.
The amicus counters that such a
reading would essentially vitiate
jurisdictional limits by allowing federal courts to resolve by settlement
claims that they do not have the
power to adjudicate.
Similarly, the respondents make
the ancillary argument that even if
§ 411(a) withdraws original federal
question jurisdiction, the supplemental jurisdiction statute of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 extends federal jurisdiction over unregistered copyright
claims when they are joined with
registered copyright claims. Relying
on Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah
Services, 545 U.S. 546 (2005),
which rejected the view that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a
civil action unless it has original

jurisdiction over every claim in the
complaint, the respondents argue
that the district court had jurisdiction to approve the settlement
because it had original federal question jurisdiction over class members' registered copyright claims
and, thus, supplemental jurisdiction
over class members' unregistered
copyright claims, even if § 411(a)
would have prevented the district
court from hearing those unregistered copyright claims by themselves. The amicus responds that
the registered claims and the unregistered claims do not form part of
the same "controversy" and thus
fail to meet that requirement of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute.
The respondents' argument also
runs up against the Second Circuit's
reasoning that the supplemental
jurisdiction statute cannot confer
subject-matter jurisdiction when
expressly withdrawn by Congress.
Congress provided for supplemental
jurisdiction "[u]nless expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute."
The Second Circuit reasoned that
§ 411(a) is a federal statute that
withdraws subject-matter jurisdiction and thus "expressly provide[s]
otherwise."
The United States, arguing in support of the petitioners as amicus
curiae, takes a moderated approach.
The United States agrees that
§ 411(a)'s limitation is nonjurisdictional. However, coupling the
emphatic language of § 411(a) with
its public function, the United
States argues that § 411(a) might
nevertheless have the jurisdictional
attribute of requiring district courts,
in most cases, to raise the issue sua
sponte if they become aware of the
defect before final judgment. The
United States maintains, however,
that § 411(a) cannot be invoked
after final judgment to undo the
class settlement here.
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SIGNIFICANCE
The case has both specific and
broad significance. Most specifically,
an affirmance will unravel a settlement that both compensates
authors for the electronic publication of their works and allows electronic databases to disseminate
widely hundreds of thousands of
freelance articles to the public. An
affirmance might also force electronic databases and publishers to
purge all articles that may have
been written by freelance authors so
as to avoid future liability.
Slightly more broadly, the decision
may affect how class action copyright infringement claims are
brought when some claims are
based on unregistered works. A
jurisdictional ruling will prevent
those claims from being heard and
may prevent the entire case from
being resolved, even if all parties
wish to have a global settlement. A
nonjurisdictional ruling will allow
federal courts to resolve unregistered copyright claims, perhaps
even those filed in violation of
§ 411(a), if the restriction is waived
or forfeited by the defending party.
Most broadly, the case has the
potential to clarify a long line
of inconsistent Supreme Court
precedent on the nature of
jurisdictionality.
A decade ago, in Steel Co. v.
Citizensfor a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83 (1998), the Supreme
Court recognized that "jurisdiction
is a word of many, too many, meanings." That recognition stemmed
from the Court's own previous conflation of "jurisdiction" with nonjurisdictional terminology, such as
"mandatory" or "important," as in
cases such as United States v.
Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960).
From 2004 to 2007, the Court
decided four cases that attempted to
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bring clarity to the doctrine of jurisdictional characterizations.
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443
(2004), held that Bankruptcy Rule
4004, which gives a creditor 60 days
to object to a debtor's discharge, is a
nonjurisdictional limit that could be
forfeited. The Court admonished
that clarity would be facilitated if
courts and litigants used the label
"jurisdictional" not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases
falling within a court's adjudicatory
authority. That same year,
Scarborough v. Principi,541 U.S.
401 (2004), held that the requirements governing attorney-fee applications under the Equal Access to
Justice Act are not jurisdictional
because they relate to postjudgment
proceedings auxiliary to cases
already within the court's adjudicatory authority. The following year,
Eberhartv. United States, 546 U.S.
12 (2005), held that the time limit
for filing a postverdict motion for a
new trial under Rule 33 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule that operates only in a case
already under a court's jurisdiction.
Finally, in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500 (2006), the Court held
that the statutory requirement that
only employers with more than 15
employees are subject to Title VII is
a nonjurisdictional element of the
claim that could be waived by a
defendant, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. In the process,
the Court imposed a bright-line
presumption against jurisdictionality if Congress did not rank a
limitation on statutory coverage
as jurisdictional.
These cases cautioned care in the
characterization process and
appeared to chart a course scaling
back jurisdictional rulings. But,
beginning in 2007, the Court
abruptly shifted course and decided
two cases that returned to jurisdictional labels.

In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205
(2007), the Court held that the time
limit for filing a notice of appeal in a
civil action is jurisdictional. The
Court relied principally on the fact
that the Supreme Court itself had
consistently characterized the deadline as jurisdictional for 150 years.
In addition, the Court drew a distinction between emphatic time limits contained in a statute and those
contained in nonstatutory rules.
The former, explained the Court,
are limitations imposed by
Congress, which is the branch that
controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Court marginalized
Kontrick, Eberhart,Scarborough,
and Arbaugh, distinguishing them
on their facts and dismissing their
generalized antijurisdiction sentiments as dicta.
In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 750
(2008), the Court held that the sixyear limitations period for suits
against the U.S. government in the
Court of Federal Claims was a
"more absolute" time bar than normal statutes of limitations. The
Court meticulously avoided characterizing the statute "jurisdictional,"
as long-standing precedent had, but
it also did not characterize the time
bar as nonjurisdictional. Instead,
the Court focused on the effects of
the time bar and held that the time
bar requires sua sponte consideration by a Court of Appeals even
after final judgment and even over
an express waiver by the United
States.
Reed Elsevier,then, presents an
opportunity for the Court to bring
some stability to jurisdictional characterization doctrine. For example,
by reaffirming the general path taken by cases such as Kontrick and
Arbaugh while limiting Bowles and
John R. Sand to their peculiar circumstances, the Court could restore
the sentiment that jurisdictional
(Continued on Page 38)

limitations are rare and should be
characterized carefully. Or, on the
other hand, by continuing to marginalize the Kontrick line of cases
while drawing upon Bowles, the
Court could chart a new path that
takes a more robust view of jurisdictionality. Either way, the Court has
the opportunity to provide some
clarity to an area of the law that
desperately needs it.
A complicating twist is that a determination that § 411(a) is nonjurisdictional may not actually result in
reversal. As recognized by the solicitor general in her brief and by
scholars cited in other briefs, a
restriction may be nonjurisdictional
but have jurisdictional traits. For
example, the solicitor general herself, despite arguing that § 411(a)
should be characterized as nonjurisdictional, suggests that § 411(a)
should have the jurisdictional feature of requiring district courts to
raise the registration issue sua
sponte. But nonjurisdictional rules
could have other jurisdictional
attributes besides a sua sponte
requirement. The Court itself recognized in Kontrick that certain nonjurisdictional rules might nevertheless be nonwaivable. If, therefore,
the Court determines that § 411(a)
is a nonjurisdictional limitation that
nevertheless is nonwaivable, it may
answer the question presented as
urged by both the petitioners and
respondents yet still affirm the
Second Circuit's judgment.
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